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Creative Military Engagement: the Indonesia Case Study

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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22 October 2009

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## Abstract

### *Creative Military Engagement: the Indonesia Case Study.*

During the past two years changes in policy and in Theater Campaign Plan development methodology altered the concept of theater security cooperation, or shaping. Shaping activities are now deliberate, focused components of integrated plans aimed at achieving specific U.S. objectives. This paper demonstrates how U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) resourcefully arranges and adapts military engagement activities with Indonesia to realize comprehensive and sustained military reform that supports U.S. objectives. The background portion of the paper discusses U.S. strategic interests in Indonesia, provides a synopsis of relevant Indonesian military factors, and describes how U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and U.S. Department of State (DoS) objectives are derived and synchronized. A comparative analysis of selections from the USPACOM Indonesia country plan and the U.S. Embassy's Indonesia Mission Strategic Plan (MSP) demonstrates the linkage between objectives and how military engagements support them. Further analysis illustrates how military engagement activities are arranged, focused and adapted to support important and lasting improvement within the Indonesian military. The conclusion explores implications derived from the analysis and provides recommendations.

## **INTRODUCTION**

U.S. military security cooperation activities used to consist of a series of haphazard, unconnected, bilateral interactions carried out whenever opportunities were available. An important change occurred within the last two years. Shaping activities are now deliberate, focused components of integrated plans aimed at achieving specific U.S. objectives. The shift to the idea of shaping as a central focus of military effort is well underway. New direction from the Department of Defense (DoD), a refocused Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) development construct, the stand-up of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), concepts like Seapower 21, and the methodical security cooperation activities that continue throughout all of the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) point to this fact.

The newly revitalized U.S. military security cooperation strategy is currently executed through the resourceful arrangement and adaptation of engagement activities. This paper demonstrates how U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) arranges, focuses and adapts military engagement activities with Indonesia to achieve comprehensive and sustained military reform in support of an overarching U.S. engagement plan. The background portion of the paper discusses U.S. strategic interests in Indonesia, provides a synopsis of relevant Indonesian military factors, and describes how DoD and Department of State (DoS) objectives are derived and synchronized. A comparative analysis of selections from the USPACOM Indonesia country plan and the U.S. Embassy's Indonesia Mission Strategic Plan (MSP) demonstrates the linkage between objectives and how military engagements support them. Further analysis illustrates how military engagement activities are arranged, focused and adapted to support important and lasting improvement within the Indonesian military.

The conclusion explores implications derived from the analysis and provides recommendations.

## **BACKGROUND**

U.S. strategic interest in Indonesia is based upon three factors. The first is the location of Indonesia astride the lines of communication between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. One-quarter of all world trade,<sup>1</sup> including one-half of the world's oil shipments and the raw materials essential for large Asian economies pass through the Strait of Malacca each year.<sup>2</sup> The strategic chokepoints around Indonesia are of vital interest to the U.S. Navy, which routinely transits the area.

Second, Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation in the world, the largest Muslim nation, and an emerging democracy.<sup>3</sup> With the exception of a fringe group of extremists, Indonesians are moderate in the practice of their faith. A flourishing Islamic democracy in Indonesia would constitute a significant strategic success for the U.S. and a significant defeat for fundamentalist adversaries throughout the world.

Third, the U.S. cannot allow Indonesia to become an ungoverned or hostile space. The country's location adjacent to critical sea lanes is too vital, and its symbolic importance as a large, moderate Muslim nation is too great. Failure of the Indonesian state would present an enormous security challenge to the U.S.

Present Tantara Nasional Indonesia (TNI, or Indonesian Armed Forces) structure is a product of evolution over time and does not reflect a holistic evaluation of required defense capabilities. The Indonesian Air Force and Navy are small and cannot adequately cover the vast, archipelagic nation.<sup>4</sup> A large Army of 280,000 personnel is distributed in provinces and

districts along territorial and ethnic lines, and a national response unit is located in the vicinity of Jakarta<sup>5</sup>. Put simply, the Army is structured and positioned based upon its history as a tool of internal control. The distribution of the Army produces a co-dependency between local populations and their corresponding military units. The territorial aspect of the TNI, limited government funding and an Indonesian cultural propensity to accept side-business as a revenue producing mechanism for governmental activity have resulted in non-government financing of many defense related activities.<sup>6</sup>

The current design of the TNI does match an overarching defense philosophy of building internal self-sufficiency, mounting a total people's defense if necessary, and protecting territorial integrity.<sup>7</sup> This overarching philosophy is not useful as a driving vision for development of a future force, but is more of a reflection of Indonesia's past and the reality of contemporary fiscal constraints.

From 1999 through 2005, TNI readiness was severely degraded by sanctions imposed as a result of TNI human rights violations in East Timor. The sanctions damaged the U.S.-Indonesia military relationship. The relationship was officially normalized in 2005, but U.S. legislation continues to link some assistance to a regime of human rights vetting. This issue continues to strain the relationship.<sup>8</sup>

Indonesia's civilian and military leadership recognized the need for defense reform and in recent years made significant progress. The Army and the National Police became distinct entities in 1999. The Defense Department assumed some control of the official military budget and procurement.<sup>9</sup> Legislation was passed mandating timelines for complete transition to state funding for military activities.<sup>10</sup> Without the benefit of a useful guiding

defense framework, the TNI managed to develop a set of very respectable goals that drive military capability development. Current TNI activities clearly indicate a shift toward leadership in multi-national forums, disaster relief preparation, and participation in international peacekeeping operations.

While the intent to reform is clear, practical progress within the Indonesian defense sector will continue to be slow because of limited resources, the nature of internal threats, and structural obstacles. Even before the recent global recession, Indonesia chose to focus investment within the domestic sector.<sup>11</sup> Threats to internal security suggest that the decision to focus resources domestically is correct as internal development and solid economic growth will increase the government's legitimacy and marginalize dissenters. Structural impediments to reform include the role of the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Army's territorial positioning. The MOD is not within the operational chain of command and does not therefore wield credible authority.<sup>12</sup> The territorial positioning of the Army and the co-dependencies created by it will likely take many years to change.<sup>13</sup>

Under these circumstances, Indonesian successes in defense reform are truly remarkable. While these developments must be viewed predominantly as Indonesian initiatives, U.S. assistance is essential. Within the context of a broad U.S. effort, the U.S. military has creatively used engagement activities to encourage comprehensive and sustained military reform in support of U.S. objectives.

During the past two years, DoD and DoS changed the way that U.S. security cooperation objectives are derived and implemented. DoD distills strategic guidance from multiple sources into the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). The GEF provides



global and theater strategic endstates, planning guidance for a variety of activities, and a construct for theater campaign planning. The Joint Staff produces a subordinate document called the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) that provides additional guidance for theater campaign planning and designates contingencies for which planning is required. Based upon endstates and guidance contained in the GEF and JSCP, each Combatant Commander develops a Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) and required branch plans. The newly implemented TCP construct establishes steady state shaping as the baseline activity that Combatant Commander's execute. Contingencies requiring transition into deterrence, seizing the initiative or dominance, for example, are considered branches from the baseline engagement and shaping activities.

Within the overarching TCP, sub-regional and country engagement plans are developed. Sub-regional plans ensure that issues impacting more than one country or space between countries are addressed. Transnational terrorism and security in the Straits of Malacca are examples germane to Southeast Asia. Country plans contain very specific objectives that are nested within the sub-regional goals. Country objectives are not based solely upon top-down military guidance. Country objectives are also based upon analysis of the relevant MSP and close coordination with the applicable U.S. Mission.

Simultaneous to the improvements within the DoD process, DoS matured aspects of the Mission Performance Plan (MPP), which subsequently came to be known as the MSP. Taken together, these improvements sharpened accountability and created the necessity for more comprehensive interaction between military staffs and U.S. missions abroad. The requirement for increased coordination has resulted in better military support to U.S. engagement strategies.

## ANALYSIS

Comparative analysis of the USPACOM country plan and the Indonesia MSP demonstrates integration of the military effort within a broader U.S. Government engagement strategy. The goals within the Indonesia MSP cover the entire range of governmental interaction, from coordination on the economy, to educational and cultural exchange, to improved communication in order to increase understanding between nations. Of the seven goals contained within the Indonesia MSP, the USPACOM country plan primarily supports one. This is not an evaluative statement, but an indicator of the scope of effort, the overall range of issues involved and the relatively subordinate nature of the military effort within the broader U.S. engagement plan.

Comparison of objectives contained within the MSP for Indonesia and unclassified USPACOM country plan objectives for Indonesia illustrate close coordination. The MSP calls for U.S. support that develops Indonesia's regional peace and security capacities.<sup>14</sup> The equivalent unclassified country objective within the USPACOM Indonesia country plan is to build TNI capacity to conduct peace, stability and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations.<sup>15</sup> Another MSP aim is to reinforce reforms underway within the Indonesian military.<sup>16</sup> The equivalent unclassified USPACOM country objective is to support defense reform that enhances civilian control of the military, professional development within the officer and enlisted ranks, and the capability to plan and manage resources at the strategic level.<sup>17</sup>

There are many specific examples of U.S.-Indonesia military interaction that support these coordinated U.S. objectives. The TNI was invited to participate as the United Nations

(UN) Headquarters during the large, multinational exercise Cobra Gold 08.<sup>18</sup> Three separate USPACOM Multinational Planning and Augmentation Team (MPAT) events during 2009 focused on developing TNI HA/DR and multinational planning skills. The USPACOM Center for Excellence (COE) in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Relief and the TNI co-hosted a UN Civil Military Coordination Course designed “to develop regional and global capacity for civil-military cooperation in response to crises.”<sup>19</sup> High Level Visits (HLV), DoD Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) events, U.S.-Indonesia Bilateral Defense Discussions (USIBDD), and a Warrior- Leader Course Mobile Training Team<sup>20</sup> are examples of military engagements that support and encourage reform. These examples, and others too numerous to mention, clearly point out that military interaction with Indonesia directly supports U.S. objectives and is imbedded within an overarching whole-of-government approach.

USPACOM interaction with the TNI further supports U.S. objectives by arranging and adapting events to achieve a persistent, enduring approach that results in a long term, comprehensive engagement methodology. USPACOM conducted 119 engagements with Indonesia during Fiscal Year (FY) 2009.<sup>21</sup> With the exception of a few single-day HLV's, all FY-09 engagement activities were multiple day or multiple week events. Engagement planning also demonstrates the persistent, enduring approach. As the FY-09 plan was being executed, 131 engagements were scheduled for FY-10,<sup>22</sup> and shaping proposals to build on these plans in FY-11 were under discussion. The planned length of certain engagement activities projects even further into the future. Plans for enlisted professional development involve U.S. training teams and enlisted Subject Matter Expert (SME) exchanges through 2020 and culminate in 2025 with TNI owned and operated professional development

programs. HA/DR capacity building plans currently extend through 2013, progressing from bilateral exercises and participation in multinational training venues to comprehensive Indonesian joint-interagency exercises and Indonesian hosting of international conferences.<sup>23</sup>

The persistent approach to military engagement with Indonesia is essential for near term interoperability and is foundational for long term partnership. As an anchor for near term interoperability, the regularity of engagement builds procedural familiarity while reinforcing technique through repetition. MPAT led rehearsals, reviews and updates of multi-national Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for HA/DR are an example.

In addition to very practical aspects such as procedural familiarity, the persistent, lasting nature of U.S.-Indonesia engagement demonstrates commitment and establishes the basis for development of relationships built upon trust. In relationships between military institutions, trust is the core of operational effectiveness. With mutual trust and respect, crises are averted or dealt with swiftly, transparency leads to open dialogue, and opportunities for expanded cooperation are opened. Without mutual trust and respect the potential for misunderstanding is increased, transparency is diminished, and opportunities are lost. Given the strategic importance of Indonesia's location and its status as an emerging Muslim democracy, the U.S. cannot afford to be anything less than persistent.

USPACOM engagement with the TNI is arranged to emphasize operational level interaction while simultaneously distributing effort across all military levels to ensure a whole-military approach. To analyze this aspect of military-to-military engagement, FY-09 military engagement activities were assessed and each engagement was categorized as strategic, strategic-operational, operational, operational-tactical or tactical, based upon the

level of the intended training audience. Many engagement activities were specifically constructed for audiences at multiple levels, and therefore drove the requirement for intermediate categories such as strategic-operational and operational-tactical. For example, an exercise designed to simulate disaster response at the operational level also included first responder training. This event was categorized as operational-tactical. For HLV's, the level of the visiting official was used to categorize the event. For example, a visit by the Commander of Army Forces Pacific was categorized as operational, and a junior enlisted exchange visit was categorized as tactical. The analysis resulted in the following outcomes:

FY-09 U.S. Military Engagement with Indonesia	
Strategic	14
Strategic-Operational	15
Operational	50
Operational-Tactical	8
Tactical	32
Total	119

The purpose of depicting the data as shown above is to highlight the dominance of operational level engagements. The 50 operational level engagements, or 41% of the total, indicate emphasis on operational level engagement. When strategic-operational, operational, and operational-tactical engagements are combined, the total number of operational level engagements sums to 73, or 61% of the total.

The operational focus is partially the product of circumstance, but is primarily the product of design. The small number of strategic actors and competition for their time naturally limits the amount of engagement that can occur at the strategic level. The relative paucity of tactical forces due to other global commitments limits tactical level engagement.

The operational level emphasis of military engagements would be retained even without these restrictions at the strategic and tactical levels. The USPACOM staff designs some engagements and adapts others to achieve the operational level focus. Examples of events designed to address operational level issues include MPAT instruction in multinational operations, HLVs by USPACOM's Service Component Commanders, and operational level dialogues such as the USIBDD. An example of an adaptation is Exercise Tendon Valiant. This medical exercise originally intended to focus on development at the medic or corpsman level and was adapted into an opportunity to discuss medical information sharing at the operational level.

Emphasis on the operational level is appropriate. Agents for change and reform exist primarily at the operational level in a military organization. Strategic level actors are often tradition bound, and tactical level actors are not positioned to implement institutional reform. The impetus for new thinking will normally be found in the Brigadiers, Colonels, and younger field grade officers who are active within the operational level. As key players at the operational level of the military, these personnel can observe a broad scope of activity and recommend improvements based upon informed, mature judgment.

Additional examination of FY-09 U.S. military engagement with Indonesia reveals balance across all military levels. Consideration of the data in three dimensions yields:

FY-09 U.S. Military Engagement with Indonesia	
Strategic/Strategic-Operational	29 (24%)
Operational	50 (42%)
Operational-Tactical/Tactical	40 (34%)
Total	119

From this perspective, engagement is distributed across all military levels. Although an emphasis on the operational level is appropriate, the balanced approach reflected in the statistics indicates a whole-military approach that is essential. The whole-military approach acknowledges the inherent linkage between military activities at all levels and facilitates institutional development by treating the partner nation military comprehensively. A large institution must reform as a whole. If capabilities and skill sets are not in place at the operational and tactical levels of a military, grand strategic ideas will not come to fruition. Tremendous advances in tactical level proficiency are meaningless and often counterproductive if not enabled by solid operational level support and sound strategy.

An example highlighting the utility of a whole-military approach is U.S. engagement related to Indonesian aviation maintenance, supply and procurement activities. Indonesia procures eleven types of aircraft from eight different countries.<sup>24</sup> This strategic decision, taken to mitigate the risk of falling out with a sole vendor nation, complicates the task of accumulating and distributing spares at the operational level, and the task of training maintainers at the tactical level. Clearly, the situation called for a comprehensive approach. USPACOM military engagement activities for FY-09 included helicopter maintenance SME exchanges in order to address the pressing need for improved aviation maintenance capabilities at the tactical level. At the operational level, spares accumulation and distribution was addressed through aviation logistics and acquisition SME exchanges and by inviting the TNI to attend the U.S. Pacific Air Force (USPACAF) Pacific International Logistics Symposium (PILS). The TNI was invited to attend the USPACOM J-4 sponsored Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Symposium (PASOLS),<sup>25</sup> which provided an opportunity to consider the impact of strategic procurement decisions on readiness and interoperability.

Military interactions with Indonesia are skillfully adapted in other ways that enhance support for U.S. objectives. One technique used is to arrange existing events over time and fill gaps in coverage through the adaptation of those events and through the implementation of new events. An example of this technique is discernible in USPACOM support in the development of Indonesian HA/DR capabilities. In 2007, the level of support included an invitation to Indonesia to attend a Southeast Asia Disaster Management Cooperation (SEADMC) event, a logistics SME visit, execution of exercise Tendon Valiant, and a bilateral Disaster Relief Exercise (DREE). This concept was incrementally improved through 2008 and 2009. The SEADMC event remained in place. Related logistics SME visits focused on strategic lift and then advanced logistics. Exercise Tendon Valiant, previously focused on first responder training, continued the traditional focus but each year placed more emphasis on operational level information exchange. DREE evolved from a bilateral exercise focused on the town level, to a small multi-national event with provincial focus, and then to a larger multinational event emphasizing multinational planning. Additional reinforcing events were added to the calendar, including USPACAF led Pacific Angel and a US Pacific Fleet (USPACFLT) led Maritime HA/DR exercise.<sup>26</sup>

Another technique USPACOM employs to leverage opportunities in support of U.S. objectives is the adaptation of an existing event to fill an un-sourced requirement in a way that achieves exponential gains. During 2009, a capstone Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) event was required within Asia. Planners identified Garuda Shield, normally a bilateral Command Post Exercise (CPX), as an opportunity to host the GPOI event.<sup>27</sup> A bilateral exercise was therefore transformed into a high profile, multinational event that



supported the U.S. objective of building Indonesian multinational interoperability and peacekeeping capacities.<sup>28</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

The preceding analysis indicates that USPACOM engagement with the TNI is arranged, focused and adapted to achieve comprehensive and sustained military reform in support of the coordinated U.S. objectives. Several observations flow from this analysis.

A remarkable level of innovation is involved in transforming engagement activities in order to progressively move toward desired endstates. While the creativity is admirable, it masks the real resource level required to conduct persistent, comprehensive engagement. A new strategy emphasizing shaping was articulated through the GEF, the JSCP and the TCP. The staff agencies and forces available to implement the new strategy have not changed. Innovation is required to match an old set of ways and means to a new end.

Engagement at the operational level provides the most potential for high return on resources invested. This is particularly important when a finite number of engagement opportunities must be used to maximum effect, as is the case in USPACOM interaction with the TNI. Operational level interactions engage actors who are in the right organizational position to make observations and implement improvements, and operational level interactions can be leveraged to gain efficiency by simultaneously engaging at the strategic or tactical level.

Although an operational level focus is appropriate, USPACOM interaction with the TNI illustrates that building partner nation capabilities to achieve U.S. objectives requires

persistent engagement across all military levels. There simply are no shortcuts, engagement designed to build military capabilities requires a significant investment of time and force.

Finally, the current USPACOM experience within Indonesia indicates that issues such as military reform and capability development are long term. These long term projects hold the potential to become enduring ventures with no endstate, and the U.S. must beware of this outcome. The USPACOM-TNI enlisted professional development plan, which culminates in an Indonesian led effort, is an example of a long term effort that culminates in a definitive endstate.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

As implementation of the new U.S. security cooperation strategy continues, careful analysis must be conducted in order to determine what resourcing changes are required to fully enable it. Military staffs tend to base resourcing recommendations on what has been done in the past. In the implementation of the new U.S. security cooperation strategy, past practice is a poor guide because available resources were innovated into a successful configuration. A long term, sustainable system must be based upon a realistic assessment of the capabilities required to achieve objectives within a timeframe that mitigates risk to an acceptable level. Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution (PPBE) inputs must be based on what should be done, not on what was done in a resource constrained environment.

The conclusion that operational level engagement provides the best return on investment indicates that future efforts to manage and align available resources to achieve U.S. objectives should focus on the operational level. Forums used within USPACOM, such as the APCSS, MPAT and the COE in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Relief

maximize operational level engagement in an efficient manner. These forums and others like them should be modified and expanded. MPAT, which essentially teaches planning and operational art, is a potential template for the development of similar organizations in other Combatant Commands and for development of similar organizations within different functional areas. For example, poor logistics processes reduce military capability levels in most developing nations, the very nations that most need to manage resources wisely. A professional, MPAT-like logistics organization would produce great effect. The same concept is applicable to other functional areas such as intelligence and communications. The value of a focused team with a prepared, standing agenda would produce exponentially greater effect than a hastily prepared SME visit.

The significant investment of time and force required to build partner nation military capabilities reinforces the validity of the foregoing recommendations and invites discussion of how tactical level forces can be employed to greater advantage. One implication of the emphasis on shaping activities is that current force levels will be required even after Iraq and Afghanistan have settled into marginally sized, semi-permanent force postures similar to current arrangements in Korea, Japan and Germany. How residual forces will be used to continue shaping Iraq and Afghanistan is an additional matter requiring consideration and planning. Another implication of the level of effort required to support meaningful engagement is that requests for forces or capabilities in support of shaping missions must become a normal activity so that aggregated global requirements are resourced from a broader, more flexible force pool. Under current circumstances such a request would be laughable. In the future it should become commonplace.

Finally, the U.S. security cooperation strategy is enduring in nature. The intent is that shaping will become routine, and that routine shaping will continue in the future. There are 36 countries in USPACOM and 195 in the world.<sup>29</sup> There will be no shortage of work in the global engagement business. Within this context, it is essential to begin engagements with a shared vision for how and when a transition to the partner nation will occur. U.S. military forces must assess effectiveness, transition when objectives are achieved and move on to the next priority.

In conclusion, U.S. military interaction with Indonesia demonstrates a resourceful use of engagement activities to achieve comprehensive and sustained military reform that directly supports fully coordinated U.S. objectives. The U.S.-Indonesia example illustrates that recent changes in U.S. security cooperation strategy will continue to have important military implications well into the future.

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<sup>1</sup> Donald B. Freeman, "The Straits of Malacca, Gateway or Gauntlet," *University of Toronto Quarterly* 74, no. 1 (2004/5): 528-530, [http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/university\\_of\\_toronto\\_quarterly/v074/74.1roosa.html](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/university_of_toronto_quarterly/v074/74.1roosa.html) (accessed 8 Oct 2009).

<sup>2</sup> Joshua Ho, "Enhancing Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: The Cooperative Mechanism," *Ocean Development and International Law*, 40 (2009): 233.

<sup>3</sup> Anne Marie Murphy, "Indonesia Returns to the International Stage: Good News for the United States," *Orbis*, 53, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 71.

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[http://search.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwar/jwara170.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Indonesian%20Army%20Territorial%20Structure&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod\\_Name=JWAR&#toclink-j1911158158606941](http://search.janes.com/Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwar/jwara170.htm@current&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=Indonesian%20Army%20Territorial%20Structure&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&Prod_Name=JWAR&#toclink-j1911158158606941) (accessed 8 Oct 2009).

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>6</sup> Lex Rieffel and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, *Out of Business on a Budget: The Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 2007), 1-10.

<sup>7</sup> *Jane's Online*, s.v. "Indonesian Army," (accessed 8 Oct 2009).

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>10</sup> Lex Rieffel and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, 10.

<sup>11</sup> *Jane's Online*, s.v. "Indonesian Army," (accessed 8 Oct 2009).

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>13</sup> Lex Rieffel and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, 10.

<sup>14</sup> U.S. Mission to Indonesia, *FY 2011 Mission Strategic Plan*, (Jakarta, Indonesia: U.S. Mission to Indonesia, 15 Apr 2009), 8. Document is Sensitive But Unclassified.

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- <sup>15</sup> United States Pacific Command, Theater Campaign Plan (U) (Camp Smith, HI: United States Pacific Command), C-2-C-12. (Secret). Classification of the document is Secret, only Unclassified material was extracted.
- <sup>16</sup> U.S. Mission to Indonesia, FY 2011 Mission Strategic Plan, 8. Document is Sensitive But Unclassified.
- <sup>17</sup> United States Pacific Command, Theater Campaign Plan (U), C-2-C-16. (Secret). Classification of the document is Secret, only Unclassified material was extracted.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid, C-2-C-2. (Secret). Classification of the document is Secret, only Unclassified material was extracted.
- <sup>19</sup> United States-Indonesia Bilateral Defense Dialogue Consolidated Activities List FY 2010, Major Kristin Means, United States Pacific Command J526, 11 October 2009.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>23</sup> Kristin Means, "2008 USIBDD Backbrief," Powerpoint, originally dated 15 Apr 2008 and updated on 11 Oct 2009, Jakarta, Indonesia: United States Pacific Command, Southeast Asia Policy Division, Country Director.
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